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DOES SET THEORY REALLY GROUND ARITHMETIC
TRUTH?
ALFREDO R. FREIRE
Abstract. We consider the foundational relation between arith-
metic and set theory. Our goal is to criticize the construction of
standard arithmetic models as providing grounds for arithmetic
truth (even in a relative sense). Our method is to emphasize the
incomplete picture of both theories and treat models as their syn-
tactical counterparts. Insisting on the incomplete picture will allow
us to argue in favor of the revisability of the standard model in-
terpretation. We then show that it is hopeless to expect that the
relative grounding provided by a standard interpretation can re-
sist being revisable. We start briefly characterizing the expansion
of arithmetic ‘truth’ provided by the interpretation in a set the-
ory. Further, we show that, for every well-founded interpretation
of recursive extensions of PA in extensions of ZF, the interpreted
version of arithmetic has more theorems than the original. This
theorem expansion is not complete however. We continue by defin-
ing the coordination problem. The problem can be summarized as
follows. We consider two independent communities of mathemati-
cians responsible for deciding over new axioms for ZF and PA. How
likely are they to be coordinated regarding PA’s interpretation in
ZF? We prove that it is possible to have extensions of PA not inter-
pretable in a given set theory ST. We further show that the density
extensions of arithmetic interpretable in ST is zero.
1. Overview
In this article we study the idea of reducing arithmetic to set theory
as a strategy for grounding arithmetic truth. The method of reduction
we have in mind is interpretation. We say that a theory T1 is inter-
preted in a theory T2, when there is a uniform mapping of theorems
of T1 in theorems of T2. This mapping should preserve the boolean
structure and bound quantifiers of T1 in a definable class of T2. We
will next indicate how model constructions can be understood as the
establishment of interpretations between theories.
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We start investigating limits in the capability of models to provide
grounds for truth. Even though our conceptualization of models is
such that each formula is either satisfied or not by a given model, our
ability to determine which option is the case is limited. The reason is
that if the only thing we know about V is that it satisfies ZF , then
we can determine that V ⊧ ϕ if, and only if, ZF ⊢ ϕ. This is the
reason why we may consider models as their syntactical representation
via interpretations. Each model definable in a given base model V ⊧
ZF can be said be to the result of bounding the elements of V to a
given interpretation I. By doing so, we can keep in mind our limited
knowledge of the models. Since, if M is definable in V (i.e. M = IV )
and we do not know any other information about V other than it
satisfies ZF , then
(1) We know M ⊧ ϕ if, and only if, ZF ⊢ ϕI
Further, we investigate the grounding relation represented by inter-
preting PA in ZF. Notably, the standard interpretation expands what
may be considered true for arithmetic – i.e. many independent formu-
las in PA become theorems as we see them in ZF through the inter-
pretation. We show in theorem 1 that this expansion occurs for any
well-founded interpretation between PA and ZF.
But, even though we expect that interpretations of PA in ZF expand
arithmetical truth, an extension of ZF does not completely decide on
arithmetical formulas. In this direction, we show that for any recursive
extension S and any interpretation I of arithmetic in S, there is an arith-
metical formula that S does not decide under this interpretation. At
any stage in the development of ZF (a recursive extension), the concept
of arithmetical truth will still be open. Some arithmetic formulas will
be undecidable under the interpretation in any recursively extended set
theory. Hence it is possible to build two structures satisfying the set
theory that disagree about the truth value of an arithmetic formula.
It is due to this phenomena that we consider what we call the co-
ordination problem: consider that there are two groups of math-
ematicians responsible for deciding over new axioms. The first will
decide over axioms for arithmetic and the second for set theory. How
should we consider the relation between the two groups? Note that if
we consider that the arithmetic group should conform to any develop-
ment provided by the set theory group, it becomes hard to see in what
sense the interpretation of arithmetic into set theory have any foun-
dational role. This framework is indistinguishable from simply taking
arithmetic to live in set theory.
Therefore, it is important to consider the possibility of the coordina-
tion between the two theories to break. Is it possible that an extension
of arithmetic not to be interpretable in any extension of a set theory?
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We show in theorem 3 that for any extension A of PA and any exten-
sion S of ZF, there is an extension A+ that is not interpretable in S.
But, how likely is it to be the case? We will further show in theorem
4 that the density of interpretable (in S) consistent extensions of A
is zero (i.e. the ration between interpretable and all extensions of A).
For this reason, the addition of axioms to set theory and arithmetic by
the two groups would preserve the interpretability relation only if the
coordination is assumed. We further conclude that this perfect coordi-
nation would empty the reductivist foundational role of set theory to
arithmetic. Finally, we briefly explore an alternative foundational role
that would avoid this problem.
2. The standard model of arithmetic
The strategy of offering set theoretical models for describing ob-
jects of a theory comes from the works of Tarski, Mostowsky, and
Robinson in the 1940s [21]. Ever since this date, mathematicians and
philosophers often resort to this strategy. It is generally accepted that
once we start talking about models, we put aside the formal aspects
of the mathematical subject and start talking about its objects and
truths. Nevertheless, because of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem and
Lo¨wenhein-Skolem theorem, there is no formal way to fix the model
of any recursive extension of Peano arithmetic. It is impossible to
say that the only model that satisfies our descriptions of arithmetic is
the intended model, no matter how extensively we describe arithmetic.
Still, using a set theoretical apparatus, we can describe the intended
model as N = ⟨ω,+, .,0, s⟩ (called the standard model). We can then
show that a set theory like ZF is expressive enough to define a truth
predicate for this interpretation.
The literature on this subject generally presents two approaches for
fixing the standard model: (i) one should offer extra-logical (or second-
order) reasons for choosing N from the myriad possible models for
arithmetic; (ii) one should abandon the model-theoretical construction
and find other ways to ground arithmetic truth. A renewed version of
(ii) can be seen in Gabbay’s defense of a new kind of formalism [8];
Moreover, others may abandon a privileged emphasis on N , because
we must focus on mathematical practice (Ferreiro´s [4]) or because we
must commit ourselves to a realistic multiverse (Hamkins [11]). Still,
differences of opinion are more common as to how and why we should
follow project (i). Those like Williamson [23] argue for metaphysical
reasons for setting N , others like Maddy [17], Quine [20] or Putnam
[19] advocate ways to naturalize the reasons for N . Finally, a recent
approach by Rodrigo Freire grounds N in the mathematical practice
using a normative basis in place of the Platonist commitment with N
[7].
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The question of the adequacy of N is often overlooked. The assump-
tion behind this is that if something is a model of arithmetic, then it
is N . We may not know why this is the intended model or even deny
that such a model exists, but conformity to N is hardly questioned.
However, presenting N as an object without further consideration is a
category mistake. Notably, a similar category mistake would be to say
that ‘it has been two sun revolutions since so and so’. The phrase ‘two
sun revolutions’ is used as quantity of time, even though it describes
a movement in reference to the Sun. Hence, the statement would be
a category mistake unless an implicity reference to Earth is assumed
– and not Mars, for instance. Precisely stated, N is an interpretation
of PA in the language of membership. It represents therefore a con-
struction of objects for arithmetic in terms of objects of a given set
theory. Hence, it is only when we fix the objects for a set theory that
the objects expressed in the construction N gain life. This idea is what
we call from now on relative grounding.
For any given model of set theory V ⊧ ZF , the interpretation N
can be understood as a procedure for obtaining a model N for PA.
The model N = ⟨Obj,+, .,0, s⟩ is build from the interpretation N =⟨U, f+, f., fs, Zero⟩ as follows:
(1) Obj = {x ∈ V ∣ V ⊧ U(x)}.
(2) 0N = a such that V ⊧ Zero(a).
(3) +N = {⟨x, y, z⟩ ∣ x, y, z ∈ Obj and V ⊧ f+(x, y) = z}.
(4) .N = {⟨x, y, z⟩ ∣ x, y, z ∈ Obj and V ⊧ f.(x, y) = z}.
(5) sN = {⟨x, y⟩ ∣ x, y ∈ Obj and V ⊧ fs(x) = y}.
Our idea is to insist on the incomplete picture of the set theoretical
representation of arithmetic. We note that V suffers from the same
problem as N , for it is based in an incomplete theory ZF. Therefore,
the picture of arithmetic obtained from reducing PA to V by N may
also be incomplete.
So to what are we committing in case we say N is the standard model
of arithmetic? It seems like the single construction for the intended
model of arithmetic is based on the idea condensed in the sentence:
‘no matter which model of set theory one is assuming, the model of
arithmetic would be given by N ’. Indeed, the picture provided by the
literature is that of revisable truth for set theory and arithmetic – but
unrevisable reduction of arithmetic in set theory. In the next sections,
we argue that for taking the standard model to have a foundational
role one should assume the interpretation to be revisable. For now,
we consider the characterization of arithmetic in set theory in more
details.
2.1. Foundational characterization of PA in ZF. Being N the
standard interpretation of arithmetic in ZF, we call the set AZFN ={ϕ ∈ L(PA) ∣ ZF ⊢ ϕN} the expansion of arithmetic truth under the
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interpretation. Indeed some undecidable formulas ϕ of PA are ‘true’ in
the standard model (ZF ⊢ ϕN). This is the case for the Go¨del formula,
Goodstein’s theorem and many others arithmetic results. We will thus
consider more broadly the question of expansion of arithmetic truth
from interpretations in set theories.
Given that I is an interpretation of an arithmetic A in a set theory S
and Th(A) = {ϕ ∣ A ⊢ ϕ}, we expect to have Th(A) ⫋ ASI ⫋ Arithmetic
truth, as we see in the figure:
A ⊢ α S ⊢ αI ArithmeticTruth
We start considering the expansion of arithmetic truth in case we
have a well founded interpretation.
Definition 1. Let x < y be the arithmetical relation ∃z(z ≠ 0∧x+z = y).
The interpretation I of an arithmetic A in a set theory S is well founded
if S proves that (i) for every subset x of UI , there is a <-minimal
element in x and that (ii) for every y, {z ∣ z < y} is a set.
Theorem 1. Let A be a consistent recursive extension of PA and S
a consistent extension of ZF. We further assume that there is a well
founded interpretation I of A in S. Then there is a formula ϕ which is
undecidable in A such that S ⊢ ϕI . In other words, arithmetical truth
is expanded under the interpretation I of A in S.
Proof. Kaye and Wong prove that PA is bi-interpretable with finite set
theory (ZFfin) in [16]
1. Since PA is bi-interpretable with ZFfin, there
is a recursive extension S′ of ZFfin bi-interpretable by B with A. Lets
suppose S is conservative for A under the interpretation I:
(2) S ⊢ ϕI if, and only if, A ⊢ ϕ
Then we can obtain an interpretation J of S′ in S such that
(3) S ⊢ ϕJ if, and only if, S′ ⊢ ϕ
1To understand this proof, it is sufficient to know that T1 and T2 are bi-
interpretable if (i) both theories interpret each other and (ii) the composition of the
interpretation is equivalent to an identity interpretation. An extensive treatment
of the bi-interpretation phenomenon in set theories can be found in [13].
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Since the bi-interpretation B is well founded and I is well founded,
J is also well founded. Thus, by Mostowski collapse, we have J is
isomorphic with the interpretation ⟨M, ∈⟩ with M a transitive class. We
note that M ⊆ Vω in S, for otherwise we would have an infinite member
a. In turn, this implies in S′ the contradiction ⋃{rank(x) ∣ x ∈ a} is
inductive.
Notably, as S′ is consistent, Vω satisfies the predicate Con(S′). It
follows that S ⊢ ConVω(S′). But this is absurd, for it would imply the
contradiction S′ ⊢ Con(S′). Therefore, the statement (2) is false. As
A ⊢ ϕ implies S ⊢ ϕI by the interpretation, there is a formula γ such
that S ⊢ γI and γ is undecidable in A. 
Another venue to consider the problem is to guarantee that the sys-
tem S realizes whether it is or not an expansion of A under the inter-
pretation.
Proposition 1. Let A be a consistent recursive extension of PA and
S a consistent extension of ZF. We further assume that there is a
recursive process δ definable in S that enumerates formulas that satisfies
S ⊢ ϕI implies A ⊢ ϕ. Then there is a formula ϕ which is undecidable
in A such that S ⊢ ϕI .
Proof. Take ϕ such that PA ⊬ ¬ϕ, then PA ∪ {ϕ} is consistent from
completeness theorem in S. Thus, for S ⊢ Con(PA), any finite ex-
tension PA + ϕ is such that S ⊢ Con(PA + ϕ). Further, for A is a
recursive extension of PA, we have that any finite subset ∆ of A is
such that S ⊢ Con(∆). So S ⊢ Con(A) from compactness theorem.
Suppose I is an interpretation of A in S and further that
(4) S ⊢ ϕI if, and only if, A ⊢ ϕ.
Thus, from the enumeration δ, we may internalize the argument in (4)
as S ⊢ ⌜(4)⌝ – since the enumeration of the converse is given by the
interpretation.
We note that (4) implies Con(A)↔ Con(S). So, by also internaliz-
ing this argument in S, we obtain
(5) S ⊢ ⌜(4)⌝→ (Con(A)↔ Con(S)).
From Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem, we have that S ⊬ Con(S).
Therefore
(6) S ⊬ ⌜(4)⌝
And this is a contradiction.
Thus the equation (4) is false. However, we know that A ⊢ ϕ implies
S ⊢ ϕI from the interpretation. We conclude that there is a formula
undecidable ϕ in A such that S ⊢ ϕI . 
A complete answer to the problem is still open. Is it possible to
build an interpretation of recursive and consistent extensions S and A
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such that there is an interpretation of A in S preserving A’s truth? We
believe not. And the results presented indicate that this may not be
possible.
A further evidence in favor of this hypothesis is that no subtheory
of any extension of ZF is bi-interpretable with any extension of PA.
This is a consequence of a theorem by Enayat and independently dis-
covered by Hamkins and me: two different extensions of ZF can never
be bi-interpretable [3, 13, 12]. Together with the bi-interpretation of
finite set theory and Peano arithmetic, the result follows. Hence, in
order to obtain a set theory equivalent to PA we must add an axiom
that contradicts ZF. And similarly that no compatible (with ZF) col-
lection of set theoretic concepts can mirror perfectly an axiomatization
of arithmetic that extends PA.
We also note that the characterization of the foundation relation by
theorem expansion relates to the mathematical practice. With the dis-
covery of the Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem in [9], some resistance to
the result was argued in the sense that the obtained undecidable state-
ment had little mathematical meaning. Later on, Goodstein [10] proved
that there are fast growing functions (called Goodstein sequences) that
cannot be proved to be total in PA. The existence of these sequences is
directly connected to the traditional Hydra problem and thus it bears
a clear mathematical meaning2. Thus the question of foundation arises
as to whether the interpretation of PA in set theory answers a sig-
nificant arithmetical problem that was not possibly addressed by the
axiomatization. And this is indeed the case as we consider Goodstein
sequences.
Notably, important results in number theory have recently become so
loaded with complicated techniques that mathematicians have begun
to question whether the proofs extrapolated Peano’s axioms. This is
the case of Fermat’s last theorem and the weak Goldbach conjecture,
proved respectively by Andrew Wiles [22]3 and by Harald Helfgott [15].
This type of question is akin to the program of reverse mathematics
and has drawn the attention of mathematicians like Harvey Friedman.
However, the validity of those theorems, whether they depend or not
on more axioms than PA, are hardly questioned. The choice is not
commonly to add axioms to PA, but to investigate arithmetic truths
in a theory that expands the extension of theorems.
We have seen that interpretations of arithmetic in set theories gener-
ally expand what may be taken to be arithmetical truth (Th(A) ⫋ ASI ).
Yet this expansion is not necessarily complete (ASI = arithmetic truth).
A confusion in this regard is due to the idea that model constructions
2A complete account on the Goodstein function can be found in Caicedo’s paper
“Goodstein’s function” [1].
3An important survey on the the state of this question (in relation to Wiles
proof) is given by Colin Mclarty in [18].
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in set theories offer venues for defining truth for interpreted theories.
Each interpretation I represents the appropriate model construction
such that the grounding set theory can provide the notion of satisfac-
tion I ⊧ ϕ for any formula. Eventually, we would have that for any
formula γ, either I ⊧ γ or I ⊧ ¬γ. However, a more syntactical approach
make it clear that this is simply the expression of the excluded middle.
Indeed, “either I ⊧ γ or I ⊧ ¬γ” should be syntactically represented by
the trivial theorem
(7) ZF ⊢ γI ∨ ¬γI
Instead, what is really wanted is a notion like
(8) ZF ⊢ γI or ZF ⊢ ¬γI
As we suppose a base model V for ZF, we are at hand with a inter-
pretation for ZF itself. In this case, the notion of truth in a model is
represented by “either IV ⊧ γ or IV ⊧ ¬γ”. However, if our supposition
of a model V is not informed by any specific information other than
V ⊧ ZF , the interpretation works simply as the identity. Therefore,
we return to the problem of establishing a notion as in (8).
Nonetheless, (8) is not achievable for any recursive extension of ZF:
Theorem 2. There are formulas α ∈ LPA that are undecidable under
any given interpretation I for any given recursive extension S of ZF.
Proof. To prove this result we should reinternalize the provability pred-
icate under the interpretation. Indeed, if we consider the theory A ={ϕ ∣ S ⊢ ϕI}, the statement “x is an axiom” becomes a semi-recursive
predication. Thus it seems that we would not be able to internalize a
truth predicate for this new theory.
The point is that we should not internalize the predicate directly for
the theory A. Instead, we note that
(1) “x is a proof in S” is recursive.
(2) “x is αI of a formula α in A” is recursive.
Thus
(3) “x is a proof in S that ends with αI of the α in A” is recursive.
We call Pr(x, y) the representation of the last statement in A.
Moreover, this is the specific proof predicate from which we con-
struct the desired provability predicate used in Go¨del’s incompleteness
theorem. Thus, by applying Rosser’s trick and the diagonal lemma, we
obtain a formula G that is undecidable in A. Therefore G is undecidable
under the interpretation I in the ZF extension S.4 
4As indicated by Rodrigo Freire, this same result can be obtained by simply ap-
plying Craig’s theorem on recursively enumerable sets of formulas being recursively
axiomatizable [2].
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This theorem can be understood as a small expansion of Go¨del’s
incompleteness theorem as we consider decidability under relations be-
tween theories. Moreover, it relates to results available in Satisfaction
is not absolute [14]. In this article, Hamkins and Yang considered the
idea that there may be arithmetical formulas ρ that two models of ZF
disagree – even as these same models agree on what is the standard
model for arithmetic. Although very insightful on interesting model
constructions, it lacks a construction for the ρ formula. This formula
is obtained as the existential for a number representing a formula. In
fact, exhibiting ρ is not possible, for it would imply the inconsistency
of ZF.
Put another way, we have shown a similar phenomena where the
disagreement can be exhibited. To make it possible we considered a
foundational view that accommodate our incomplete understanding of
set theory and arithmetic. Thus, agreement about arithmetic is to be
understood as having similar sets of arithmetical truths {ϕ ∣ S ⊢ ϕN},
being S some stage (or alternative stage) in the development of ZF.
In this sense, there is a formula ρ that would be true in some possible
development of S and false in some other possible development of S.
3. The coordination problem
Lets consider the following fictional scenario for the development
of set theory and arithmetic. There are two group of mathematicians
that would decide about new axioms for set theory and arithmetic. The
first Gs is responsible for set theory and the second Ga for arithmetic.
Lets further assume that Ga agrees with the standard expansion of
arithmetic in ZF (AZFN is considered valid for Ga). How should we
frame the relation between the two groups?
Consider that Gs have decided in favor of new axiom α to set theory
ZF. Notably, this would expand the set of arithmetic truth in AZF+αN .
Should Ga consider this new set to be true? This being the general
attitude towards arithmetic means that the standard reduction deter-
mine new truths for arithmetic. In what sense does, thus, the standard
interpretation provides a foundation for new arithmetical truths? If
we think the standard interpretation does this, it seems like we have
simply assumed that arithmetic lives in set theory, without any fur-
ther considerations. After all, this framework bounds the expansion of
arithmetic truth to the expansion of set theoretic truth. Therefore, Ga
would have no authority over new arithmetic axioms after all.
In order to make room for this setting, one should consider that
we have a better understanding on how arithmetic is reduced to set
theory than we have for each of the theories. And, for this to work in
general, we should consider the reduction of arithmetic in set theory
unrevisable.
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Very often we consider ourselves to have a good understanding on
relations between things that we may not have a good understanding.
This is the case between the translation of a sentence like “Napoleon
was an emperor”. We may have lots of doubts about the ontological
status of the words used in this sentence and still be confident about
how to translate it to Chinese.
Indeed, we may be more confident about the way we reduce arith-
metic to set theory than about truth in those theories. Yet this is not
sufficient to assume the unrevisability of the reduction relation. Af-
ter some investigation over the concept of emperor, one has realized
that the standard translation of emperor in Chinese does not really
represents what English speakers refer with ‘emperor’. For instance,
emperor is usually translated as ‘Huangdi’ in Chinese, even though this
word associate the monarch with his divinity. In English, although of-
ten associated with divinity, the word emperor can be used without
divine association. So a more intricate description as ‘Napoleon was
the non-divine man who ruled over the French empire’ would be better
(even if it is not practical).
If there are grounds for taking N to be a privileged interpretation,
those would be based on partial representations of arithmetic and set
theory. Therefore, the idea that N correctly works as a connection
between the theories may be simply because we haven’t advanced the
theories enough. This would be a similar case if a Chinese working in
the translation of a western modern history book has been translating
‘Emperor’ as ‘Huangdi’. It seems perfectly fine if he believed this to be a
general translation, given that the only time he applied the translation
was for the ‘Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire’. But as he starts
translating the Napoleonic period, the broader picture would force him
to reconsider the generality of the translation.
A different picture would be the case where the Chinese translator
invented a language where w means ‘blue chair’. Finding someone else
using w to refer to a red chair, he could correctly accuse the person
to be using the word incorrectly. So this would be similar to the case
where we consider arithmetic to be a definition inside set theory. But
this being the case would imply that there is no foundational gain in
studying the relation between the theories.
Whereas set theory has a foundational role for arithmetic, we may
now consider that the standard interpretation is a good yet revisable
set theoretic inspection over arithmetic. It is precisely because we
assume the interpretation to be revisable that a foundational relation
can be argued. As truth expands in both theories we evaluate conflicts
and revise, if necessary, the interpretation to accommodate changes. A
summary of the steps in the coordination of Ga and Gs can be:
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(1) Every addition of axioms to one theory should provoke an in-
spection over the adequacy of the current interpretation of arith-
metic in set theory.
(2) If a conflict emerges in the development of the theories, the two
groups should meet to adjust the interpretation to prevent the
conflict.
(3) The adequacy of an interpretation should have reasons for itself
apart from accommodating the interpretation.
As we see in step 2, the two communities should sit together and
reevaluate the state of the reduction, if necessary. Hopefully, these
conferences would hardly occur. But we should allow some indepen-
dence to each group. For otherwise their development, especially on
arithmetic, would turn to be by definition assumed in the development
of the other.
We have added some life to the grounding relation by allowing it
to fail. Nevertheless, there is still a deeper problem. The following
scenario is still possible:
(i) Each instance of the development allows one to fix the interpre-
tation between the theories.
(ii) And at least one of the extension of any state of arithmetic is
not possibly interpreted in set theory.
Allowing both of these possibilities weakens the edifice of the ground-
ing relation. Each moment in the development of the theories is an
incomplete stage in which we cannot anticipate the impossibility of re-
ductions occurring further in the development of the theories. From
(i), any addition to the theories allows one to find (or keep) an interpre-
tation of arithmetic. However, from (ii), finding those interpretations
do not add to idea that arithmetic is indeed reducible to a given set
theory. This scenario is possible, as we will see in the next theorem.
Theorem 3. Let S be a consistent extension of ZF and A an recur-
sive extension of PA, then there is an extension A∗ of A that is not
interpretable in S.
Proof. We extend the theory A by generating a sequence of theories
that are not interpretable in S by a particular interpretation I. Being
these theories compatible with each other, the union of them will not
be interpretable in S.
Let A0 = A and {I1, I2, . . .} an enumeration of all interpretations
from the language of PA in the language of ZF. (abbreviation: T
J≤ T ′
represents “T is interpreted in T ′ by J”)
Ai+1 = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩Ai + ¬ϕ in case Ai
Ii≤ S,Ai ⊬ ϕ and S ⊢ ϕIi for some ϕ
Ai +G, otherwise, being G the Go¨del formula for Ai
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Let A∗ = ⋃
i∈ωAi. We note that A∗ is a consistent extension of A. We
prove that this theory is not interpretable in S.
Suppose A∗ is interpretable by I in S, then I = Ik for some natural
number k. Notably, if a theory T is interpreted in a theory T ′, then
any subtheory of T is interpreted in T ′ by the same interpretation.
Thus the entire sequence of theories {A1,A2, . . .} is interpreted in S
by Ik. In particular, we have Ak
Ik≤ S and that Ak+1 = Ai + ¬ϕ or
Ak+1 = Ak + G as in the definition. In the first case, we obtain the
contradiction S ⊢ ϕIk and S ⊢ ¬ϕIk . In the second, we have either the
contradiction Ak
Ik≰ S or that, for all α, Ai ⊢ α if, and only if, S ⊢ αI .
But, since Ai ⊬ G, it follows S ⊬ GIk – which, in turn, implies the
contradiction Ak+1 Ik≰ S. 
Let A = AZFN , Ak the Akermman interpretation of membership in
arithmetic language and consider that a formula ϕ is equivalent to(con(ZF ))Ak in A. Suppose also that the group Ga considers ϕ to be
valid. Notably, this formula would represent a relation between natural
numbers such that the standard interpretation stops being an correct
interpretation of arithmetic. Similar constructions can be used to gen-
erate a myriad of examples. However, each of these examples can be
subject to a ‘contrary to intuition’ kind of criticism. In the case pre-
sented, one may suggest that (con(ZF ))Ak means that we are adding
an axiom representing consistency of ZF in the arithmetic without do-
ing the same in the set theory. Simply adding the axiom con(ZF )
to our set theory would make the standard interpretation work nicely
again. Nevertheless, we note that the phenomenon presented in the
theorem is not exactly to add isolated axioms, but to add a recursive
enumeration of axioms (or scheme axiom) to the arithmetic. Our sug-
gestion is therefore that a bundle addition of axioms may force the
theories to loose coordination. We also note that we do not impose the
set theory S to be recursive. For this reason, one may simply consider
that S is a complete extension of ZF. In this case, no addition to the set
theory would possibly allow the theories to recover the interpretability
relation.
We argued that it is possible for the theories ZF and PA to part ways
along the path of development. Although disturbing, this may simply
account for the meaningfulness of the question about the reduction
between the two theories. We have considered that we should conceive
it to fail (even fatally, as in this case) in order to not take for granted
that the reduction works. Note further that this pays tribute to the
idea that by interpreting arithmetic in set theory we should inform
something that was not simply given, i.e., that arithmetic lives in the
realm of set theory. Nonetheless, we should now show that the ratio
between the number of extensions of PA that are interpretable in any
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given extension of ZF and all possible consistent extensions of PA is
zero. Our claim is that, for this reason, the coordination between
the systems can work only if the coordination is assumed from the
beginning and as a principle.
Theorem 4. For every consistent extension S of ZF, the ratio between
the number of interpretable in S extensions of PA and the number of
consistent extensions of PA is zero.
In this case, we say that the density of interpretable extensions of
PA in S is zero.
Proof. Lets consider the set Σ of consistent extensions of PA.
From the incompletness theorem, there is a formula G that is unde-
cidable in PA. Thus both PA +G and PA + ¬G are consistent.
Notably, this is still true for the addition of any finite number of new
axioms α1, α2, . . . , αn. There is a formula G that is undecidable in PA+{α1, α2, . . . , αn}. The process of adding axioms continues indefinitely.
Lets then index extensions with binary numbers in the following way:
(1) A0 = PA.
(2) If G is the Go¨del sentence in Ai, then Ai1 is Ai +G and Ai0 is
Ai + ¬G. (i1 and i0 are the binary extension of the number i
with the digits 1 and 0)
(3) Σ = {An ∣ n ∈ ω} is the set of finite extensions of PA.
Note that each member of Σ is a finite extension of PA. Now we
include infinite extensions of PA in Σ. Let Π be a set of ⋃C, for each
C a subset-chain in Σ. The index for the members of (Π ∖Σ) can be
describe by functions ω Ð→ {1,0}. Thus, as a simple consequence, the
set of indexes of the extensions is in bijection with P (ω).
Each theory with infinite sequences as indexes is indeed a different
theory, for any difference in the sequence means that one theory has a
formula like G and the other formula ¬G.
Nonetheless, the number of interpretations is countable. Also, since
the same interpretation cannot accommodate incompatible theories,
there must be a extension of PA that is not interpretable in the exten-
sion S. Moreover, as we are comparing countable possible interpretable
extensions with uncountable non-interpretable extensions, the density
of interpretable extension is zero. 
We note that the same can be obtained, even if the starting point
includes all theorems of the set theory S under the interpretation. In-
deed, we can include the theorems under a given interpretation at any
point without interfering in the result.
Corollary 1. For every consistent extension S of ZF, the density of
consistent extensions of a S-standard version of PA ({φ ∣ S ⊢ φI},
being I the current standard interpretation) that are interpretable in S
is zero.
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To prove this corollary, we need only to include the result in the
theorem 2 in the strategy of the last theorem.
Although extensions like A+ are in general not interpretable in S,
the process of generating these theories is internalizable in S. There-
fore, we may say that S proves the consistency statement for all these
extensions. This is not enough to claim a proper foundational rela-
tion. The model construction emerging from this type of consistency
proof is simply given by the existence of a model as in the Henkin
canonical construction. Thus the foundational model one can generate
provides little more information than saying that the theory is consis-
tent5. Therefore, we should not consider those cases as a path to avoid
the problem discussed in this section.
As developed in this section, we should not consider that the addi-
tion of new axioms to the systems are in principle coordinated. Instead,
the reducibility of arithmetical truth should be a result of the expres-
siveness of set theory. However, assuming that the choices of the two
groups Ga and Gs would result in a interpretable arithmetic is similar
to expect that a random choice of a real number to be a natural number
(which has probability zero). It follows that the coordination between
the groups of mathematicians can only occur in principle. Hence, the
reduction of arithmetic truth to set theory is not attainable unless as-
sumed and the foundational relation should be based on other grounds.
To further elaborate on this conclusion, lets consider a metaphor.
Picture the situation in which we have the unstable equilibrium of a
sphere on a hill with a very small slope. We would like to say that
the appearence of equilibrium represents our intuitions about the re-
duction between the theories being correct. Indeed, we have put the
sphere in a position that appears to be an equilibrium. As the slope of
the hill is very small, our perception of equilibrium works really well.
However, even if it takes a long time, it will become evident that the
interpretation of PA in ZF is not in equilibrium.
The ideas developed in the present article, especially in theorem
4, bring attention to the fact that we are talking about an unstable
hill. No matter how the sphere appears to be at rest, we know that
eventually it will gain traction and fall. The project of using N for
grounding arithmetic truth is equivalent to finding the equilibrium peak
of the hill. It seems to be a good project as we focus on the movement
of the sphere – but an analysis of the geography of the hill is already
sufficient to conclude this hill to be unstable. We should not base our
foundational investigations in guarantying that we have the correct
interpretation. Instead, we should use the interpretations as it informs
about arithmetic concepts and as it considers bundles of arithmetic
formulas in the very expressive environment of set theory. The standard
5A general survey on the kind of information this Henkin model construction
can be viewed in Translating non Interpretable Theories [5].
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interpretation N should not be taken to be the relative grounding
of arithmetic in set theory.
Our position is not that the standard interpretation N cannot have
a foundational role. Alternatively, the very possibility of investigating
expansions of arithmetic propositions provided by analyzing N (or other
interpretations) is all the ground we need. In place of using founda-
tional relations to establish ‘arithmetic truth’, we propose using the N
interpretation to understand how bundles of arithmetical propositions
relates to each other. In this case, we use the technical apparatus and
the expressiveness of theories like ZF to analyze arithmetical concepts
instead of fixing its truth6.
4. Final remarks
Rather than manipulating models of PA, we considered interpre-
tations of PA in ZF. Our goal was to accommodate the incomplete
picture of the set theoretical metatheory into our analysis of the foun-
dations of arithmetic. The standard interpretation expands what we
may consider true in arithmetic: many undecidable formulas in PA
become theorems when examined under the interpretation in ZF. This
is a general phenomenon. For every well founded interpretation of re-
cursive extensions of PA in extensions of ZF, the interpreted version
of arithmetic has more theorems than the original. This shows that
studying arithmetic inside set theory can be significant. As one con-
sider these interpretations, one is exploring the expansion of arithmetic
truth and how the addition of bundles of axioms play out.
We continued by introducing the coordination problem. We consid-
ered two independent communities of mathematicians responsible for
deciding over new axioms of ZF and PA. Using this setting, we stud-
ied the possibility of coordinating PA with PA’s interpretation in ZF.
Nonetheless, we proved that it is possible to have extensions of PA
not interpretable in a given set theory ST. Moreover, we considered a
given recursive extension A of PA and a extension S of ZF. Here, we
prove that the density of extensions of A that are interpretable in S is
zero. This last result implies that the coordination between the two
communities of mathematicians should be coordinated from the start.
However, we argued that this would empty the foundational role of set
theory over arithmetic.
We have, therefore, set a framework to criticize the notion of ground-
ing truth between theories such as arithmetic and set theory. However,
this is not to be understood as a general criticism of the idea of using
set theory to investigate foundational matters regarding arithmetic.
Instead, we have soley shown that it may be flawed to assume that
6A important development of a foundational role in this spirit has been studied
by Rodrigo Freire in [7, 6].
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set theory really provide grounds for arithmetic truth or a definitive
description of the universe of numbers. Our suggestion is therefore to
consider a foundational relation that aims primarily at conceptional
clarification of the concepts involved in the studied theory. An ex-
pressively rich environment such as set theory is armed with tools to
study arithmetical relations in wider settings than it would be possible
without leaving its deductive apparatus.
References
[1] Andre´s Eduardo Caicedo. Goodstein’s function. Revista Colombiana de
Matema´ticas, 41(2):381–391, 2007.
[2] William Craig. On axiomatizability within a system. The journal of Symbolic
logic, 18(1):30–32, 1953.
[3] Ali Enayat. Variations on a visserian theme. arXiv preprint arXiv:1702.07093,
2017.
[4] Jose´ Ferreiro´s. Mathematical knowledge and the interplay of practices. Prince-
ton University Press, 2015.
[5] Alfredo Roque Freire. Translating non interpretable theories. South America
Journal of Logic, 2020.
[6] Rodrigo A Freire. On existence in set theory, part ii: Relative productivity.
Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 55(1):91–105, 2014.
[7] Rodrigo A Freire. Interpretation and truth in cantorian set theory. preprint,
2015.
[8] Michael Gabbay. A formalist philosophy of mathematics part i: Arithmetic.
Studia Logica, 96(2):219–238, 2010.
[9] Kurt Go¨del. U¨ber formal unentscheidbare sa¨tze der principia mathematica und
verwandter systeme i. Monatshefte fu¨r mathematik und physik, 38(1):173–198,
1931.
[10] Reuben Louis Goodstein. On the restricted ordinal theorem. The Journal of
Symbolic Logic, 9(2):33–41, 1944.
[11] Joel David Hamkins. The set-theoretic multiverse. The Review of Symbolic
Logic, 5(3):416–449, 2012.
[12] Joel David Hamkins. Different set theories are never bi-interpretable. Mathe-
matics and Philosophy of the Infinite, March 2018.
[13] Joel David Hamkins and Alfredo Roque Freire. Bi-interpretation in weak set
theories, 2020.
[14] Joel David Hamkins and Ruizhi Yang. Satisfaction is not absolute. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1312.0670, 2013.
[15] Harald A Helfgott. The ternary Goldbach conjecture is true. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1312.7748, 2013.
[16] Richard Kaye and Tin Lok Wong. On interpretations of arithmetic and set
theory. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 48(4):497–510, 2007.
[17] Penelope Maddy. A second philosophy of arithmetic. The Review of Symbolic
Logic, 7(2):222–249, 2014.
[18] Colin McLarty. What does it take to prove Fermat’s last theorem?
Grothendieck and the logic of number theory. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic,
16(3):359–377, 2010.
[19] Hilary Putnam. Mathematics without foundations. The Journal of Philosophy,
pages 5–22, 1967.
[20] Willard V. Quine. Ontological reduction and the world of numbers. The Jour-
nal of Philosophy, 61(7):209–216, 1964.
DOES SET THEORY REALLY GROUND ARITHMETIC TRUTH? 17
[21] Alfred Tarski, Andrzej Mostowski, and Raphael Mitchel Robinson. Undecidable
theories, volume 13. Elsevier, 1953.
[22] Andrew Wiles. Modular elliptic curves and Fermat’s last theorem. Annals of
mathematics, 141(3):443–551, 1995.
[23] Timothy Williamson. Absolute provability and safe knowledge of axioms.
Go¨del’s Disjunction: The scope and limits of mathematical knowledge, pages
243–252, 2016.
